Six agencies and 26 helicopter runs hold the line at TPA Putri Cempo

A fire that started in Block D

On the evening of Wednesday 2 September 2026, fire broke out in Block D of TPA Putri Cempo, the municipal landfill in Kelurahan Mojosongo, Kecamatan Jebres, Solo. It spread to Block B and then to Block C.

The following day, Mayor Respati Ardi declared a 14 day emergency response status. BNPB confirmed on 3 September that there were no fatalities.

The area affected is reported differently across sources. An early assessment on 3 September put the burned area at about 2.17 hectares. RRI Surakarta, reporting the same evening, described roughly 6 hectares across the three blocks. The gap is wide enough to state rather than reconcile, and it reflects how difficult area estimation is at an active landfill fire where smouldering and flaming fronts do not share a boundary.

RRI reported the trigger as methane gas. That is the ordinary cause at Indonesian landfills holding large volumes of decomposing organic material, and it is the detail that connects this incident to national policy rather than leaving it as a local accident.

What the response assembled

By Thursday 3 September, 15 fire units and 151 combined personnel were working the site, drawn from the fire service, BPBD, the environmental services department, TNI, Polri and volunteers. BPBD Klaten sent water tankers and personnel across district lines through Thursday morning, which is the kind of mutual assistance that does not happen automatically and usually reflects arrangements made before an incident rather than during one.

On Friday 4 September the response added an air component. A helicopter carried out 26 sorties, drawing water from the Bengawan Solo and delivering roughly 9,000 litres per run, about 234,000 litres in total, over approximately two hours from 10:00 WIB. Each drop cycle took around five minutes. Support came from Polresta Surakarta and Sat Brimob Polda Jawa Tengah.

AKP Lingga Ramadhani of Polresta Surakarta described the aerial effort as concentrated on the eastern side, where smoke was still rising. Ground operations paused during the drops, a standard and necessary safety measure that also slows the overall tempo.

By Friday morning the fire service reported measurable progress.

Thank God, as of this morning there is 40 percent progress in the handling of the extinguishing effort.

That was Indradi, Head of the Solo Fire Department. He and his colleagues identified the constraints plainly: the characteristics of the accumulated material, changing weather, shifting wind direction, and difficult access on the eastern side of Block C. Narrow approach roads were a recurring problem for crews.

Cooling, which involves injecting water into the waste mass rather than only wetting the surface, was expected to take around a week after the visible flames were out. That distinction matters for anyone reading progress figures. A landfill fire is not finished when the smoke stops.

Keeping 400 tonnes a day moving

Solo generates about 400 tonnes of waste a day, and that does not pause because the landfill is alight. The city's response to this was the operational part of the story, and the more transferable one.

Access roads were prioritised for firefighting vehicles, which meant tipping had to be rationed. The environmental services department, led by Herwin Tri Nugroho, restricted access to L-300 light trucks and barred three wheeled waste vehicles. On 4 and 5 September, service ran from 14:00 to 17:00 WIB with one trip permitted per kelurahan. Waste was tipped behind the factory area rather than at the weighbridge.

For 6 to 8 September the schedule was refined further, with government plated vehicles served from 08:00 to 12:00 and general vehicles from 13:00 to 17:00. Queues of trucks still formed along the approach road.

Regional Secretary Budi Murtono described the approach as accommodating what could still be accepted while keeping volumes below normal levels. Kelurahan offices were asked to hold shipments temporarily while conditions were monitored.

Publishing a daily tipping schedule during an emergency, with vehicle types and time windows specified, is a small administrative act that prevents a second failure. Without it, trucks arrive and wait, access roads clog, and the fire response itself slows. Solo issued schedules through its environmental department's own channels and revised them as the situation changed.

The restrictions did fall unevenly. Waste pickers who work the site came to City Hall over the limits on incoming material, a reminder that emergency measures at a landfill interrupt livelihoods as well as logistics, and that a response plan is more complete when it anticipates that.

Methane is the cause, and it is the fixable part

The significance of this fire for other local governments lies in what started it. Methane accumulates where large volumes of organic material sit in an unmanaged mass. Every landfill still operating on an open dumping basis during a dry season carries that risk, and the risk is not evenly distributed across the site. It concentrates in the oldest, deepest, least compacted blocks.

This is precisely what the national push to end open dumping is designed to address. A landfill receiving mostly residual waste, with organic material diverted upstream, generates far less methane. A site operated as a controlled or sanitary landfill, with daily cover and compaction, gives fire far less to work with.

Solo has a waste to energy facility at Putri Cempo and is working toward ending open dumping at the site. The fire is an argument for accelerating that transition rather than a verdict on the city, and Solo's own response showed an administration capable of coordinating six agencies and an air asset within 48 hours.

Sirkularium's view for government and public institutions

Three observations for local governments heading into the remainder of the dry season.

First, on mutual assistance. The arrival of BPBD Klaten resources at a Solo site within a day is the detail worth copying. Cross district assistance for landfill fires works when the agreements, radio protocols and tanker compatibility are settled in advance. Provinces should consider convening their districts to formalise landfill fire mutual aid before the next dry season rather than during it.

Second, on continuity planning. Every district with a single landfill should hold a written plan for what happens to daily collection when that site is partly or wholly unavailable. Solo improvised a workable schedule quickly. A pre agreed plan naming vehicle types, time windows, alternative tipping locations and a communication channel would have avoided the queues entirely, and would also set out how waste pickers and private hauliers are handled during the restriction.

Third, on prevention economics. The cost of this response, in 151 personnel, 15 units, 26 helicopter sorties and a week of cooling, is a real number that sits against the cost of daily cover, compaction and gas management at the same site. Local governments finding it hard to fund routine landfill operations should present those two figures side by side in budget discussions, because prevention is almost always the cheaper line.

What to watch next: confirmation of the final burned area once the site is cooled, whether the emergency status closes within its 14 days, the restoration of normal tipping capacity, and the timetable Solo sets for ending open dumping at Putri Cempo.

No lives were lost, six agencies worked one site, and the city kept its collection running. Sirkularium will continue following the recovery.